Arms Control and Disarmament-A Case Study for Pakistan

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Abstract

Arms Control refers to limitations in the quantity or quality of certain types of weapons, while disarmament seeks to eradicate arms, either in their entirety or by respective groups. The basic purpose of arms control is to reduce risk of war or to reduce destructiveness when war occurs whereas objective of disarmament is the complete elimination of War. Conflict between Pakistan and India continues to dominate the strategic destiny of South Asia since decades. Both countries born in conflicts, have never resolved fundamental differences in their view over the state of Kashmir or number of lesser issues and indeed some in India still question the very existence of Muslim Pakistan, disputing the need for two nations on the subcontinent. Mechanism of arms control and disarmament has been used as a negotiating tool to bring stability in IR. Presently, so many nuclear weapons have been developed and deployed all over the world that a slightest mistake or miscalculation could blow up the world. Origin of Pakistan’s nuclear program lies in its adversarial relationship with India. Pakistan has consistently opposed fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) because the lack of control over existing stocks would allow India to retain unaccounted pre treaty fissile material. Resolution of Kashmir issue will not usher in an era of arms control and disarmament because of Indian security concerns with regards to China. Huge defense expenditures of Pakistan and India have seriously retarded economic progress and social uplift of the people. Once the Kashmir issue is settled, discussions on arms control and disarmament can be started bilaterally. Whereas if Kashmir issue is relegated, it will not be good for the future of population in large already living below the poverty line in both countries. Nonetheless, there is a possibility for trilateral discussions on arms control and disarmament with the help of China.

Keywords: Arms Control, Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan – India Relationship, Kashmir issue

1. Introduction

Let me start with the definitions of two key terms arms control and disarmament so that there is no confusion arising out of semantics. The terms are often used synonymously, but arms control actually refers to limitations in the quantity or quality of certain types of weapons, while disarmament seeks to eradicate arms, either in their entirety or by respective groups. According to Thomas C Schelling and Maron H Halperin, the objectives of arms control are: to reduce risk of war; to reduce destructiveness when war occurs and to reduce the cost of providing an adequate military defense. The objective of disarmament is the complete elimination of war and the weapons of war as one option in the settlement of dispute between nations. Disarmament may be mutual or unilateral.

The history of arms control agreements can be traced back as early as 1139 when Pope Innocent II attempted to ban use of the crossbow. But it is imperative to understand the theory of arms control prior discussing the situation of Pakistan in relation to arms control and disarmament. The theory of arms control includes all those actions taken by antagonistic countries to reduce weapons despite conflict interest. The arms control may be further divided in to two separate segments which include nuclear and non nuclear weapons control.

a. Nuclear Weapons Control: Since the inception of nuclear weapons, and immediately after its first use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945 it was realized by the world community that such a devastating and lethal weapon need to be eliminated. Since then many treaties, regimes, rules regulations restrictions have been contemplated to stop further making or acquiring of these weapons. Some of the examples are NPT, FMCT SALT-1, SALT-2, START, NEW START, PSI, CSI HMCR and

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3 Ibid
MTCR. There is a long list of these treaties and regimes, a separate book can be compiled on all treaties, regimes, rules regulations and restrictions but in this paper focus will remain on the situation of Pakistan in relation to arms control and disarmament. Presently US, Russia, UK, France, China, India and Pakistan are declared nuclear powers where as Israel also contemplating for capability. Nonetheless, all are committed for nuclear weapons arms control and disarmament.

b. Conventional Weapons Control: Other then nuclear weapons all other weapons are considered to be the conventional weapons. Since the focus of all super and big powers remained for nuclear weapons arms control and disarmament, so much work has not been done for non nuclear weapons control and disarmament. In fact western countries are the major share holder in manufacturing, production and sale of these conventional weapons. In fact the defense industry in the world being recognized as the major source on earning and contributor to the national exchequer, thus no one is interested in the west to control these weapons or such industries.

c. Small Arms Control: The emerging non traditional threat especially from non state actors is from the small arms and light weapons which are easy to carry and use. The main distinction between small arms and light weapons is that small arms are easily hand carried which could be from pistols to automatic weapons. Where as the light arms can be categorized in the domain of anti air craft guns to RPGs. As for Pakistan is concern there is a need to enforce a robust borderer control regime to interdict illegal cross border movement of persons, goods, drugs and precursors, weapons or any other material threatening internal security of Pakistan. Pakistan’s border along with Afghanistan needs special attention/ dedicated efforts to minimize illegal smuggling of weapons. In addition Government of Pakistan must enforce a comprehensive small arms control regime across the country forthwith.

Arms Control and Disarmament: Prior discussing the situation of Pakistan in relation to arms control and disarmament, I would be appropriate to define the two key terms, arms control and disarmament so that there is no confusion arising out of semantics. These terms are often used synonymously, but arms control actually refers to limitations in the quantity or quality of certain types of weapons, while disarmament seeks to eradicate arms, either in their entirety or by respective groups. The basic purpose of arms control is to reduce risk of war or to reduce destructiveness when war occurs and to reduce the cost of providing an adequate military defense. Where as the sole objective of disarmament is the complete elimination of war and disarmament may be mutual or unilateral. But in the discourse of my research regarding the situation of Pakistan in relation to arms control and disarmament, I will only dilute upon nuclear issue.

Historical Perspective: The history of arms control agreements is centuries old, but recently in the twentieth century, number of important treaties were concluded like Washington Naval Treaty(1921) pertaining to productions of vessels: Geneva Protocol of 1925 on Bacteriological and Chemical weapons, The League of Nations Disarmament conference of 1932 and the Second London Naval agreement of 1935. Except for the Geneva protocol, other agreements did not succeed. After World War II, the Baruch and Gromyko plans of 1946 proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons but were unsuccessful due to cold war. In 1952 the UN established the UN Disarmament Commission and in 1954 the Sub Committee on disarmament which was disbanded in 1957. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) came into existence in July 1957. Following the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis US and Soviet negotiators successfully concluded the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the first of several hot lines agreements 1963. Later US-Soviet relations further improved and various agreements were concluded; Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the1980 Convention on the physical protection of Nuclear Material and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty(CTBT). Although the CTBT has been signed by 182 states, it can only enter into force after being ratified by nine more i. e. China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and USA. The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War(1973), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty(1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty(1976)and the two SALT Treaties. The Geneva Summit (1985) between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev opened the door to new talks resulting in INF Treaty in 1987, and the promise of additional negotiation to reduce or to eliminate entire classes of nuclear and conventional weapons. Experiences of Europe and Middle East .The arms control efforts in Europe and the Middle East provide a basis to build on the peace process in South Asia. There are a number of similarities can be drawn. However, care needs to be taken not to attempt to apply them indiscriminately without giving due consideration to peculiar socio economic, political and security environment existing between India and Pakistan. The historical and cultural setting of International politics in South Asia is more diverse than Europe or North America due to ethnically and religiously more diverse societies. As against NATO

4 Dr Tughral Yamin, “The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, The Army press, Islamabad,p.52
versus Warsaw Pact,’ in Asia Kashmir dispute is the major flash point between India-Pakistan. Stalemate between roughly two equal parties does not exist in South Asia and there is not yet a willingness to set aside force as means to alter the status quo. The US-Soviet and European experience suggest that incremental progress towards narrowly focused but meaningful confidence and security building measures can be made between hostile and states, at least if a mutual deterrence relationship exists that makes revision of the status quo by force seem unattractive. The nuclearization of the three major actors of South Asia is likely to create such a mutual deterrence relationship, making the prospects for CSBMs there more hopeful for the future7. Similarly the experiences gained from the Middle East have useful application in resolving Indo-Pakistan disputes. Like the Arab-Israeli arena, South Asia especially the Indo Pakistan is characterized by conflictual relationships. The conflicts involve long-standing disputes over substantive issues, including territory, but also reflect, and therefore perpetuate deep seated antipathies and mutual suspicion connected to question of political and communal identity and images of self and other; the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir clearly incorporates all these dimensions. As in the Arab-Israeli case, instability in South Asia is accentuated by plethora of internal security threats fo mented by real or perceived transfrontier support8. The South Asian region has certain differences which have positive implications for promoting peace in the area. These differences are; no party denies the legitimacy of the other and the adversaries maintained normal, if volatile, diplomatic, and commercial relations and direct communications. The process of conflict resolution and normalization of relations is facilitated by such conditions such as recognition of each other’s sovereignty and existence of direct communications channels.

Arms control and Disarmament in India-Pakistan perspective: The conflict between India and Pakistan continues to dominate the strategic destiny of South Asia, despite global and regional structural changes over the decades9. Relations between India and Pakistan have been marked by stops and starts since the two states were created in 1947. Born in conflict, they have never resolved fundamental differences in their view over the state of Kashmir or number of lesser issues, and indeed some in India still question the very existence of Muslim Pakistan, disputing the need for two nations on the subcontinent10. Immediately after the Cold War the optimism of India-Pakistan rapprochement started growing. However, the expectations from Pakistani side quickly fizzled out. Both the countries remain embroiled in their antagonism and peace continues to remain elusive. Since 1947, the history of India-Pakistan relations is a saga of mistrust, suspicion and animosity. There have been periods of comparative calm but peace has been a far cry. This paper will examine the option of arms control and disarmament in the context of India-Pakistan relations and establish its viability, draw conclusions and recommendations. The paper will also discuss the conditions prevailing in South Asia which are favorable or repugnant to arms control and mutual disarmament and finally draw conclusions. Relations between India and Pakistan have been marked as fragile since the very inception of Pakistan in 1947. (Both countries born in conflict, have never resolved fundamental differences in their view over the state of Kashmir or number of lesser issues, and indeed some in India still question the very existence of Muslim Pakistan, disputing the need for two nations on the subcontinent). Owing to un-predictable relationship of these two countries, one characteristic stands out clearly and that is the use of force in pursuit of the national security objectives. Deterrence and coercion rather than reassurance and cooperation to promote security and other national interests have been the norm. There is a broad consensus in India and that is if Kashmir is given independence or allowed to join Pakistan because it has a Muslim majority, it will be tantamount to conceding the idea of religious states and sounding the death knell of India’s secularism11. Given the complexity of the Kashmir issue and the inflexibility shown by both sides to deviate from their established positions, there is no hope that this issue will be resolved in a foreseeable future. A military solution is not a viable option now because neither of the countries is in a position to impose its will on the other. The policy of deterrence by bluff and pronouncements on use of nuclear weapons option12 in India and in Pakistan has further stalemated the military response. Arms control and disarmament measures have been used successfully in the past to promote peace and stability in a region.

Why the mechanism of arms control and disarmament has been used: The mechanism of arms control and disarmament has been used as a negotiating tool to bring stability in International relations. During cold war rivals used arms control negotiation to manage and maintain strategic stability. It was considered a convenient method

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11 Professor Doctor M A Hussain Malik, "Kashmir Conflict, the Cause of Frustrated Economic Take off in India and Pakistan-A Politico-Economic Assessment” Pakistan Defence Review, No. 1, Volume 5, (June 1993): 46d.

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to keep the expensive arms race from spiraling out of control\textsuperscript{12}.

**Factor that contributed towards the Shift of Arms Control and Disarmament:** The most contributing factor towards the shift of arms control and disarmament was the realization that so many nuclear weapons have been developed and deployed that a slightest mistake or miscalculation could blow up the world many times over\textsuperscript{13}.

**Arms Control Measures:** Arms control measures include a wide array of bilateral and multilateral treaties binding nuclear and non nuclear countries to desist, control and reduce conventional and nuclear weapons\textsuperscript{14}.

**Factors Dependent upon Arms Control Negotiation:** The success of arms control negotiations or any in state talks is dependent on following variables like national policies, quality of diplomacy and leadership, history and geography, Demography, Military powers and economic strength\textsuperscript{15}.

**Deterrence and Nuclear Disarmament:** Deterrence at the policy level is understood to be the strategy of discouraging hostile action by a potential aggressor. The essence of deterrence is that one sate party prevents the other from doing something that the other party does not want by threatening to harm the other party. So the primary focus on state craft is preventing an outright military attack\textsuperscript{16}.

**International Arms Control Regime:** Prior discussing the situation of Pakistan in relation to arms control and disarmament, it would be appropriate to discuss international arms control regime. During cold war arms control politics was conducted on two different levels:

**First Level:** The two super powers maintained symmetry in weapon holding through a series of bilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations.

**Second Level:** They set the rules to allow selective entry in to the nuclear club with a view to establishing nuclear order in their own favor\textsuperscript{17}.

**Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT):** SALT Initiated in 1968, the treaty was signed and sealed in Moscow in 1972. Alongside SALT, the biological weapons convention (BWC) and the ABM Treaty (ABMT) was also concluded. SALT was a significant breakthrough in bilateral arms control. It froze the no of ICBM launchers at the existing level and allowed the addition of new SLBM only after dismantling the older ones\textsuperscript{18}.

**SALT-II:** SALT-II was signed in June 1979, limiting US and Soviet ICBM, SLBM and the bomb based nuclear forces to 2400 delivery vehicles defined as ICBM silo, submarine missile launch tube or a bomber. It also placed restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces. SALT was upgraded to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START in early 1980s\textsuperscript{19}.

**START I AND II:** START I & II negotiated in early 1990s placed specific caps on the nuclear weapons stock. The agreement restricted the number of deployed war heads by imposing limits on delivery vehicles and required the destruction of excess delivery vehicles\textsuperscript{20}.

**Destruction Verification:** Destruction was verified through intrusive verification regime, involving onsite inspection, and regular exchange of information as well as national technical means like satellite\textsuperscript{21}.

**New START:** START process was revised by obama in his first term as president. New START was signed by the heads of state of US and Russia in April 2010 in Prague. This progress in the field of arms control was hailed as major foreign policy success of obama\textsuperscript{22}.

**Function of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency):** IAEA is a formidable body with a mandate to carry out intrusive inspections of nuclear projects. IAEA serves as a nuclear watch dog and regulates the international nuclear norms\textsuperscript{23}.

**Treaties on Arms Control and Disarmament:** Different treaties like Partial Test Ban treaty (PTBT) 1967. Non proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1971, Treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapons of mass destruction on sea bed and ocean floor, comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These treaties did little to curb the super powers nuclear abilities and served primarily to limit the nuclear ambitions of third party.

**CTBT Treaty:** CTBT treaty was signed by 182 states, it can only enter into force after being ratified by nine more i.e China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and US\textsuperscript{24}.

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\textsuperscript{12} Dr Tughral Yamin, “The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, The Army press, Islamabad,p.23
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid
\textsuperscript{16} Dr Tughral Yamin, “The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, The Army press, Islamabad,p.27
\textsuperscript{17} Dr Tughral Yamin, “The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia", The Army press, Islamabad,p.85
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid
\textsuperscript{19} Dr Tughral Yamin, “The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia", The Army press, Islamabad,p.86-87
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid
\textsuperscript{22} Dr Tughral Yamin, “The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia", The Army press, Islamabad,p.91-92
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid
\textsuperscript{24} Dr Tughral Yamin, “The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia", The Army press, Islamabad,p.93

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NPT Treaty: Critics of NPT term it as discriminatory for allowing only five more powerful countries i.e France, China, Russia, UK, US to keep nuclear weapons while denying the acquisition of nuclear weapon technology to the rest of the world\textsuperscript{25}.

Negative fallout of NPT: NPT membership has negative fall out like preventing countries with genuine security concerns to acquire nuclear deterrence legitimately and tempting them to run covert programmer\textsuperscript{26}.

Pakistan's efforts towards nuclear free environment in South Asia: In 1995 Treaty of Bangkok disallowed the use or threat of nuclear weapons in the area of signatory countries. As per agreement South East Asia was declared as Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWZ). The then Pakistani Prime Minister Ms Benazir Bhutto proposed a similar arrangement in South Asia but India did not agree to the proposal. After India's nuclear explosion in 1974 Pakistan was very keen to organize a nuclear free environment in South Asia neither the Soviet nor the Americans whole heartedly supported Pakistan idea. Pakistan moved the proposal for a South Asian (NFWZ) before the UNGA sessions on October 28, 1974. Although it was accepted by 82 votes in favor and 2 against (India and Bhutan). It never becomes reality\textsuperscript{27}.

Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Pakistan asserts the origin of its nuclear programme lies in its adversarial relationship with India. The two countries have engaged in several conflicts centered mainly on State of Jammu and Kashmir. Initial step towards the development of Pakistan's nuclear programme was establishment of PAEC. After the 1971 defeat in conflict with India, Bhutto issued a directive instructing the country nuclear establishment to build a nuclear device within three years.

India's Nuclear Explosions: On 11 and 13 May 1998, India conducted a total of 5 nuclear explosions which Pakistan felt pressured to respond. The then Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif decided to test and detonated five explosions on 28 May and 6\textsuperscript{th} on 30 May1998.

Post test announcement: In a post test announcement Pakistan stressed that the test was necessary response to Indian and that Pakistan's nuclear weapon were only in the interest of national self defense.

Pakistan's Nuclear Capability: Pakistan currently possesses a growing nuclear arsenal and remains outside both the treaty on non- proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT).

Disarmament and non proliferation policies: Pakistan is not the signatory to the Treaty on Non Proliferation of nuclear weapon (NPT). In fact it is considered that Pakistan is the sole country blocking the negotiations of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In reality, the FMCT treaty aims to cap the production of fissile material which is not acceptable to Pakistan. So Pakistan is ready to sign FMCT if subject issue is addressed.

Pakistan's opposition against FMCT: Pakistan has consistently opposed this treaty because the lack of control over existing stocks would allow India to retain unaccounted pre treaty fissile material. Which it could then divert it to making more Bombs.

Pakistan’s Stance on FMCT: The official Pakistan's stance is that wide disparity in fissile material stock pile of India and Pakistan could erode the stability of nuclear deterrence. Pakistan feels that under present shape, FMCT does not address the genuine security concerns. Pakistan wants existing stocks of fissile material to be accounted for before the treaty comes in to force.

Pakistan’s Stance on Disarmament: Pakistan's stance on nuclear disarmament is that it will only give up nuclear weapons if India given its own nuclear arsenal. Process of disarmament and no proliferation must be non-discriminatory and issue should be taken up on the Conference of Disarmament (CD) in comprehensive manner. Pakistan stance is that talks should be held on all the three elements of nuclear disarmament, non proliferation, arms race in outer space and negative security assurance.

Complex issue - jigsaw puzzle: A critical review of the factors which have shaped Indo-Pakistan antagonism would reveal that the question of arms control and disarmament related to these countries is much more complex and multi-dimensional than a jigsaw puzzle or other similar issues in other regions of the world, the jingoistic feelings aroused by the political leadership to suit their self centered political motives and to consolidate their power over a period of time have further complicated the issue. With every year passing without serious efforts of conflict resolution through peaceful means mainly the Kashmir issue, more and more complexities are adding to the security scenario. The arms control and disarmament option is almost a nonstarter if considered in the context of India-Pakistan only.

Trilateral Issue: A rationale presented by leading government officials of Indo-Pak to justify the current state of their weapon’s programme is an analogous to the Ocean Food Chain-'big fish eats little fish that has just eaten a very little fish. China created its nuclear deterrence with fears of Moscow and Washington in mind. India is feared by China and Pakistan is feared by India. It, therefore, follows that any arms control and
disarmament initiatives between India and Pakistan are inconceivable without Chinese involvement. Many argue that the arms control proposals are impracticable without having some sort of parity, conventional or nuclear between the belligerents.

**Negotiations on arms control:** Negotiations on arms control can only start when both India and Pakistan discontinue their nuclear policy, openly go nuclear and declare their specific nuclear capabilities or number of nuclear weapons already acquired or which can be produced. In my opinion, similar kind of environment of mutual deterrence already exists between them through nuclear ambiguity and no significant advantages can be derived from an open nuclear policy to facilitate the process of arms control. It is believed that in the recent past armed conflict between India and Pakistan was averted on two occasions; in 1998 Kargil crises and in 2001 stand off because of the existence of nuclear deterrence though opaque in nature.

**Determined and Bold Political Leadership:** Talks on arms control and disarmament can be conducted by strong, determined and bold political leadership on both sides. The two countries have experienced political instability and weak governments in the recent times especially in India where split mandates, deep political polarization and a hung parliament have prevented formation of any strong government with a clear majority to pursue any major peace initiative and engage in any meaningful dialogue with Pakistan. In the recently concluded general elections in Pakistan on (25 July 2018) Mr Imran Khan Prime Minister of Pakistan in his first (victory) speech has proposed better relation with India starting with bilateral trade and reaching its climax by resolving Kashmir issue. Resultantly, Indian counterpart Mr Modi called Mr Imran Khan and extended his well wishes for future. Nonetheless, there is a need to transform these positive gestures into practical steps towards sustainable peace And resolution of long outstanding conflicts between Indo-Pak. Whereas in India, Mr. Narendra Modi’s Bhartia Janta Party(BJP) and its allies swept India’s elections conducted during May 2014 are now suppose to respond positively. The relevant election in Pakistan, political stability has been experienced after a long time. Indian counter part Mr Modi Though the present government has a clear majority in the parliament yet it faces some political challenges with the consolidation of the opposition. So, by and large on a comparative basis presently both countries are in a position to respond favorably to any arms control proposals. The CBMs existing between India and Pakistan have helped in diffusing the tension in the past. However, it would be naive to expect anything substantial from these measures to bring fundamental changes in the security environment. These measures have not been put to test in a potentially grave crisis yet. It is the core issue of Kashmir which can lead to such a serious crisis. Other issues or irritants have either been created because of it or exacerbated by it. This dispute has been largely responsible to push the two countries into a continuous security dilemma and resultant arms race. Although 2019 is election year in India but instead of waiting for the new Government of India in next year, it is imperative that Modi’s Government must respond positively. Starting with Trade all regional issues including poverty alleviation and Kashmir to be resolved mutually by both countries.

**Recommendations**

1. Talks on Nuclear and conventional CBMs between India and Pakistan must be restarted from the frozen point after Lahore declaration as both governments are recently elected with heavy mandate.
2. Bilateral agreement for controlling heavy armor and force limitation zone needs to be contemplated.
3. Bilateral agreement for controlling Missile Arms race needs to be discussed.
4. Restraint over raising additional missiles units/groups
5. An Anti Missile treaty between India and Pakistan needs to be signed.
6. Bilateral agreement for controlling the nuclear weapons arms race needs to be contemplated.
7. Bilateral agreement on non deployment of nuclear weapons needs to be contemplated
8. Bilateral agreement for nuclear risk reduction centers needs to be finalized.
9. Bilateral agreement to abandon tactical nuclear weapons.

**Conclusion**

Unless Kashmir issue is resolved peacefully, arms control initiatives have no prospects to succeed. However, the resolution of the Kashmir issue will not usher in an era of arms control and disarmament automatically because of Indian security concerns with regard to China. Nevertheless, For Pakistan it will considerably reduce tension with India and provide sufficient motivation for the latter to even consider unilateral reduction in its defense expenditure irrespective of Indian reciprocity. For India, it will have to negotiate similar arrangements separately with china.

Huge defense expenditures of both the countries have seriously retarded the economic progress and social uplift of the people. The decision making elite of the two countries has started realizing the ill effects of this non-development outlay. However, they find themselves in a state of quandary as to how should they mould the public opinion to make them accept new realities and support their policy. The political leadership is apprehensive of the massive public outcry in the event of a settlement of the Kashmir issue contrary to their aspirations-and expectations which have been nurtured and shaped by them and their predecessors. They lack the courage or
vision to take bold initiatives because they fear the wrath of their constituencies. The Indian leadership has a greater responsibility being the champions of the biggest democracy of the world to act out of the box, show accommodation and magnanimity, and respect for international opinion expressed through Security Council resolutions. Once the Kashmir issue is settled, discussions on arms control and disarmament can be started bilaterally. Whereas if Kashmir issue is relegated in the garb of trade and Aman ki Asha, it will not be good for the future of the population in large already living below the poverty line in both countries. Nonetheless, still there is a possibility for trilateral discussions on arms control and disarmament with the help of China.

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